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ABSTRACT 
This paper centrally asks for the ways in which ubiquitous, ever new digital technologies of ‘our’ 
everyday lives transform learning at the digital human-machine interface from the perspective of 
feminist science and technology studies. How to account for emerging forms of interwoven human 
and machine learning? Suggesting the term of learning cultures in approaching this question, the 
paper emphasizes an understanding of learning not as a proficiency of an entity embodying either 
natural or artificial intelligence, but rather as a culturally situated and materially enacted process. In 
so doing, the paper brings together recent impulses that suggest a re-conceptualization of learning, 
e.g. through the notion of “machine learners” (Mackenzie 2017) or that of “posthuman learning
(Hasse 2018)”. Reading these insights together, I will finally suggest an account of becoming respon-
sible for learning cultures of digital technologies through a reconsidered notion of interwoven hu-
man/machine learning.
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1 INTRODUCTION 
There is no consensus on the relevance of 
digitisation for culture and society. 
Gertraud Koch, 2017  
Ubiquitous, ever new digital technologies seem 
to become of increasing importance to‘our’ eve-
ryday lives, ranging from the apparently long-
established smart phone, robot lawn mowner 
and vacuum cleaner to smart home assistants, all 
distributed by the leading technology companies 
of the Global North. The core technology of 
what can be framed as constituting “the internet 
of things” (Greengard, 2015) are smart miniatur-
ized computers. The IoT then stands for a tech-
nologization of ‘our’ human existence that is 
characterized by the massive evolution of com-
puting capacity that allows connecting things 
and persons, or connecting to others in new 
ways.  
This paper is interested in the human-machine 
interfaces emerging through technologies of the 
IoT. Even though there might not exist a consen-
sus on the relevance of digitization, it argues that 
digital interfaces are not only constitutive of 
new forms of how humans and ‘smart things’ re-
late. Rather, from these new relations also 
evolve new forms of learning between humans 
and those digital technologies of connecting. 
Therefore, it suggests to research digitization as 
a ressource for reconsidering how humans learn.    
By acknowledging the impact of emerging digi-
tal human-machine interfaces on ‘our’ learning 
processes, this paper moreover suggests to re-
consider the conceptual foundations of the very 
notion of learning itself from the perspective of 
first feminist learning theory and second femi-
nist studies of science and technology (FSTS). 
Background for this reconsideration is a notion 
of learning that understands the latter not as a 
purely cognitive capacity, but rather as the result 
of experience and as closely tight to ‘our’ being-
in-the world (cf. Meyer-Drawe 2012 [2008]).  
From such a phenomenological perspective, 
digital devices in their infrastructural dimen-
sions also require posing the following ques-
tions: How to account for emerging forms of in-
terwoven human and machine learning? And: 
How does such an account of interwoven learn-
ing challenge the notion of responsibility?       
In the following sections, the paper will first pre-
sent its approach to such a conceptual reconsid-
eration of learning at the interface between hu-
mans and digital technologies to then bring in-
sights of critical FSTS scholarship on digital 
learning together with (post-)phenomenological 
learnig theory in order to establish the notion of 
human/machine learning. Finally, this will serve 
as a point of departure to generate impulses for 
re-adjusting what it means to become responsi-
ble for human-machine relations of interwoven 
digital learning.        
2 THE IOT: CONCEPTUAL 
CLARIFICATIONS 
The IoT appears at the same time ubiquitous as 
intangible. It might figure in a device like the 
smart home assistant, but it also encompasses 
the very infrastructure that makes it possible to 
connect. Therefore, it seems to be important to 
first enhance the graspability of the phenomenon 
‘IoT’. I suggest doing so by reconstructing a se-
lected historical aspect of this complex phenom-
enon. This, as I will continue to argue in the fol-
lowing subsections, means to trace a trajectory 
of miniaturized computers that suppsosedly 
blend in to ‘our’ everyday environments. Map-
ping aspects of this trajectory then becomes the 
point of departure to make the quality of connec-
tion of digital devices more tangible and there-
fore also the seemingly diffuse nature of human-
machine relations that the IoT implements. 
Through this, I will also begin to tackle the ques-
tion of learning at the emerging interfaces.  
Further, I argue that the proposed approach 
means to situate the IoT, that is, approaching the 
IoT through the feminist epistemological lens of 
“situated knowledges” (Haraway 1991). This in-
cludes to situate knowledge claims, e.g. through 
tracing aspects of the IoT’s trajectories as well 
as the emerging technical infrastructure and de-
vices within the complex and interwoven power 
and spatiotemporal relations as constitutive 
frame of the IoT. Situating the IoT, I will in the 
following subsections reconstruct briefly 1.) the 
historical aspect of ubiquitous computing and 
2.) the discursive-material properties of the 
emerging digital interface to then 3.) generate an 
understanding of the nature of connecting imple-
mented by the IoT and ask how this new mode 
of connecting also challenges ‘our’ concept of 
learning at the digital human-technology inter-
face.     
2.1 THE IOT AND UBICOMP – 
HISTORICAL INSIGHTS 
The IoT can be regarded as pertaining to 
longstanding imaginations of a “calm technol-
ogy which receeds into the background of our 
lives” (Weiser 1991) – an imagination which 
emerged from the effort to evolve personal com-
puters into an ubiquitous, but calm machinery of 
our everyday lives. Mark Weiser popularly 
coined the term of ubiquitous computing 
(ubicomp). He envisioned computational futures 
by asserting that “personal computing had not 
gone far enough“ (Dourish and Bell 2011, 2). In-
stead, he worked on making computational tech-
nologies the fabric of ‘our’ political, economical 
and social lives. As Paul Dourish and Genevieve 
Bell (2011) put it, Weiser’s highly influential 
“technomyth” was based on his anticipation of 
“a world suffused with information technology, 
in which daily life might bring some people into 
contact with many, interconnected devices, 
large and small” (3). However, and as they also 
underline, the technomyth of ubicomp operates 
on the technical and imaginative level. That 
means to acknowledge the ways in which imag-
inations not only set the limits of how ‘we’ think 
about technologies, but also how ‘we’ develop 
technology – in short, which  kind of technology 
can be, is and will be developed.  
Ubicomp as a concept might have moved into 
the background of computational interests, how-
ever, the very principles of it that can be framed 
as realizing a suffuse of our world with infor-
mation technology, have moved to the fore of 
contemporary technology development. But-
what exactly does that mean? The IoT as per-
taining to the larger category of calm technology 
is fundamentally based on realizing a world in 
which “every ‘thing’ either is a computer, has 
one attached to it, or at least in some way is con-
nected to the Internet” (Kinder-Kurlanda and 
Boos 2017, 197).  
In the following subsection, I will reconstruct 
the importance of situating the IoT within the 
context of ubicomp for grappling with the qual-
ity of connection between humans and digital 
technologies as well as its impact on human 
learning.   
2.2 MAKING THE 
INFRASTRUCTURE & 
INTERFACE OF THE IOT 
TANGIBLE 
Prerequisite to the ability to connect digitally is 
the capacity not only to compute, but im-
portantly, to constantly collect (sensory) data. 
The latter allows “to identify and localise ob-
jects in time and space (ibd.). However, this also 
means that the person, using connected, digital 
devices, turns into the producer of a vast amount 
of data, e.g. data that tracks and monitors how I 
move to the city, what I eat and how I sleep. 
These aspects have been discussed, for instance, 
prominently by Deborah Lupton (2016) coining 
the term “the quantified self”. Lupton provides 
an important figure for the analysis of digitiza-
tion with which she maps the regulative aspects 
of monitoring and tracking that highlight the di-
mensions of control over as well as optimization 
of subjects implemented to the constant collec-
tion of data through digital, networked devices. 
With this, Lupton not only provides an account 
of datasized self-embodiment and the concomi-
tant concept of the self as regulated through 
quantifiable data, but also points towards the 
problem of ownership over data.            
For the porpuse of this article, I underline that 
the aspect of an increasing datafication of ‘our’ 
lives and bodies inherent to the IoT makes pal-
bable the ways in which digital connectivity is 
not an abstract phenomenon happening in the 
relam of numbers. Rather, it displays that digital 
connectivity is a socio-cultural and, importantly, 
material transformation of the very grounds of 
‘our’ living. In turn, it requires to be analyzed 
through a perspective of FSTS which asks for 
the ways in which binary oppositions are re-
worked or redrawn through digital connectivity 
as world-making phenomenon.   
However, and as I would like to emphsize, the 
latter is not exclusive to newly evolving forms 
of relation between humans and digital, net-
worked devices and the concomitant digital in-
frastructure. Rather, it can be argued that the en-
tanglement of the socio-cultural and material 
grounds of ‘our’ existence is a quality inherent 
to computational culture at large.  
Kathrine N. Hayles (2012) describes in “How 
we think” the impact it has on her working when 
the computer breaks down or the Internet is dis-
connected: “I feel lost, disoriented, unable to 
work—in fact, I feel as if my hands have been 
amputated” (21). Being cut off from the Internet 
for several days just recently, I can only confirm 
Hayles’ description – though I felt not like my 
hands have been amputated, it nevertheless had 
a tremendous effect on my ability to work as an 
academic. Hayles further continues that the ina-
bility to work, especially when thinking and 
writing is your work, is not only a psychological 
effect of the computer as a networked device. 
Rather, she points out the following:  
“[R]esearch indicates that the small habitual ac-
tions associated with web interactions—clicking 
the mouse, moving a cursor, etc.—may be ex-
traordinarily effective in retraining (or more ac-
curately, repurposing) our neural circuitry, so 
that the changes are not only psychological but 
physical as well. Learning to read has been 
shown to result in significant changes in brain 
functioning; so has learning to read differently, 
for example by performing Google searches” 
(ibd.).  
I regard Hayles argument as vital for making the 
IoT in its effects on our lives more tangible. If 
the calm technology is becoming a part of our 
existence, we will have to understand the ways 
in which connecting to the IoT is not only about 
producing data, but is also an embodied process 
that involves the capacity to alter ‘our’ physical 
structures. In addition, this also implies to take 
into account the ways in which learning is an 
embodied process and that acquiring a capacity 
such as reading is highly dependant on the me-
dium we learn to read with. Learning to read a 
book or learning to read a google search on my 
computer or digital gadget thus make not only a 
difference in ‘our’ capacities to read, but also in 
‘our’ embodiments of that capacity.    
Furthermore, embodiment and physical contex-
tualization appear to be key in realizing calm 
technology.  This can be traced back to the fact 
that the idea of ubicomp evolved from “the per-
ceived failure of the personal computer to deli-
ver meaningful value to human beings” 
(Dourisch and Bell 2011, 10). Notably, Weiser 
and his colleagues were confronted with the cri-
tique of anthropoligsts such as Lucy Suchman, 
who were working at XEROX in Palo Alta 
around the time when Weiser (1991) began with 
his work on the “computer for the 21st century”. 
As Dourish and Bell point out, the influence of 
the work of Suchman and others “critical of the 
traditional conceptions of computation, interac-
tion, and practice embedded in computer system 
design” (ibd.) cannot be underestimated.  
In consequence, calm technology that moves 
into the background can be regarded as an at-
tempt to increase the value of computers for hu-
mans. This attempt involves embedding digital 
technologies in the already existing infrastruc-
tures of our everyday lives and thereby also 
making digital technology a part of our material 
daily environments – in a manner that “moved 
away from the desktop and [...] was distributed 
across a range of devices, each specialized to 
particular sorts of tasks” (ibd., 11). 
In what follows, I will turn to the question of 
learning with regard to the IoT from the perspec-
tive of one selected phenomenological feminist 
learning theory that I will bring into conversa-
tion with selected findings in (F)STS on human-
machine relations of learning. My focus in this 
is to avoid an either technooptimistisc or tech-
nopessimistic perspective in grappling with the 
nature of connectivity provided by the IoT. Ra-
ther, I suggest to shift from a binary opposition 
between subject and digital technology towards 
a co-constitutive account of connectivity and its 
implications for learning in a phenomenological 
sense.     
3 ON HUMAN LEARNING WITH 
DIGITAL DEVICES 
In which ways does embedded and distributed, 
digital technology impact processes of human 
learning? To address this question, it is neces-
sary to briefly outline my understanding of hu-
man learning. Differentiating between specific 
educational practices and methods of learning 
on the one hand as well as on the other the ques-
tion of how to understand the very nature of 
learning, I follow Meyer-Drawes (2012 [2008]) 
work on conceiving of the latter in terms of the 
capacity of being-in-the-world where learning is 
experience. This means to draw on a phenome-
nological account of learning that, in short, cen-
trally focuses on (embodied) experience and 
thereby brings the sensual over the cognitive as-
pects of learning to the fore. A phenomenologi-
cal account of learning understands the latter as 
my involvedness in the world and happens when 
I am confronted with the new that challenges me 
1 There exists a large corpus on embodied cognition 
from varying disciplinary backgrounds with equally 
varying foci, discussing, e.g., how cognitive capacities 
are always interrelated to the physical and social world 
as well as how 
to act (differently). This, furthermore is thought 
of as a specific human capacity (cf. ibd.).  
The focus of this paper is to understand the 
meaning of digital technologies of the IoT as co-
constitutive for human learning conceived of as 
experience in such a phenomenological manner. 
Hayles (2012) understands the digital interface 
as constitutive of new forms of experience, 
when she writes:    
“The more one works with digital technologies, 
the more one comes to appreciate the capacity of 
networked and programmable machines to carry 
out sophisticated cognitive tasks, and the more 
the keyboard comes to seem an extension of 
one’s thoughts rather than an external device on 
which one types. Embodiment then takes the 
form of extended cognition, in which human 
agency and thought are enmeshed within larger 
networks that extend beyond the desktop com-
puter into the environment” (23). 
With Hayles, I consider distributed and embed-
ded digital technologies to be constitutive of re-
lations between humans and those technologies 
that are characterized by an embodied extended 
cognition. Especially the idea of the human be-
coming physically enmeshed within larger net-
works of distributed cognition appears promis-
ing for developping a notion of learning specific 
to the process of experiencing the IoT.1 
In addition, Hayles makes palbale the ways in 
which digital connectivity means to become part 
of the embedded and embodied digital infra-
structure – a status that challenges the division 
between human and technological entity, inter-
nal and external as well as human and techno-
logical (cognitive) capacities. This then, can be 
regarded as the point of departure to ask for the 
ways in which human learning as experience 
and machine learning as computational capacity 
also become enmeshed in new ways through, 
e.g., the IoT (1) and how ‘we’ could conceptual-
ize the emerging forms of enmeshment.
we have to understand them as öprocessual capacities. I 
have discussed aspects of this corpus with regard to digitl 
technologies elsewhere, see Treusch 2018 a, b and for an 
overview: Fingerhut et al. 2013  
In what follows, I will present two recent ap-
proaches towards the interwovenness, but also 
differences between human and machine learn-
ing.    
3.1 MACHINE LEARNERS 
Adrian Mackenzie (2017) explores machine 
learning as a capacity of our contemporary digi-
tal devices that moves beyond ‘pure program-
mability’ of the machine. This means that ‘our’ 
devices start to learn – whereas learning here 
means a statistical process based on constantly 
collecting sensory data which is then quantified 
through classification. However, Mackenzie 
also contests an understanding of machine learn-
ing as purely based on statistical models of 
learning that can be reduced to amounting to a 
positivist, capitalist knowledge economy. Ra-
ther, he understands machine learning as a 
knowledge practice which assembles “accumu-
lation of forms, techniques, practices, proposi-
tions, and referential relations” (30). With this, 
he expands the critical analytical toolkit for re-
searching machine learning as the basical prin-
ciple behind digitsation and quantification 
emerging from the digital connectivity of the 
IoT.    
Nevertheless, he acknowledges that “machine 
learning is a convoluted but nevertheless con-
crete and historically specific form of calcula-
tion” (7) that constitutes a “form of knowledge 
production and a strategy of power” (9). In this 
way, knowledge production through machine 
learning can be understood as an execution of 
power in a Foucaudian sense (cf. ibid.). At the 
same time, Mackenzie also moves beyond a crit-
ical account of the (powerful) workings of ma-
chine learning “without preemptively ascribing 
potency to mathematics or algorithms” (ibd.).  
Furthermore, he develops an account of data 
practice or the process of practicing data for re-
searching machine learning. It allows to map the 
archeology of machine learning in terms of a 
foundational transformation of (human) 
knowledge production or in Mackenzie’s words 
that of “’brainwork’” (13). This means to map 
the conditions and practices through which data 
practice becomes ‘our’ truth: “data practice […] 
reconfigures local centers of power and 
knowledge by redrawing human-machine rela-
tions” (9).  
Mackenzie is specifically interested in machine 
learning’s potential to challenge and change al-
ready established forms of data practice. This 
potential arises from the processes of reconfigu-
ration implied to practicing data as the latter is 
exceeding “the coming together of algorithm, 
calculation, and technique” as a “coherent or 
complete” (17) process. The reconfigurative na-
ture of data practice insists on the possibility to 
“articulate their diversity, loose couplings, and 
mutability” (ibid.). In short, Mackenzie argues 
for a close reading of data practice as a pre-req-
uisite for enhancing the possibilities of non-heg-
emonic standardizations. This “would function 
as a mode of experimentation on operations” 
(209).  
3.2 ON POSTHUMAN LEARNING 
Cathrine Hasse (2018) differentiates between 
human, posthuman, and machine learning. With 
this, she basically problematizes ‘the human’ as 
a powerful modern figure: “the human is not a 
stand-alone individual engaging with a world of 
discrete objects, as has been the belief since the 
enlightenment, but a posthuman ‘coming-into-
being’ with socio-cultural materiality” (1-2).  
In this regard, she dismantles the idea of auton-
omy and agency as capacities of the ‘human’ 
subject in order to expand the human and human 
learning with an account of his or her constitu-
tive embeddedness in a physical, socio-cultural 
environment. As Hasse emphasizes, “machine 
learning in AI builds on an outdated paradigm of 
the detached, rational human” (ibid.). In conse-
quence, Hasse offers an account of learning as 
“becoming skillful in an evolving process of col-
lective socio-cultural material epistemology” 
(ibid.).  
The detached rational human is a figure of a 
computational culture that can be framed under 
the term of cognitivism. Through this vein, hu-
man cognitive capacities are described, e.g. as 
based on following fixed rules, or following a 
serial step-by-step path. Such conceptualiza-
tions have been analyzed as being Cartesian in 
nature, and thus, centrally perpetuating the 
mind/body split  (e.g. Wheeler 2005). Though 
since the early 1990s new strands of an embod-
ied and embedded AI (e.g. Brooks 1991) have 
been emerging, cognitive theories that are 
rooted in a Carteisan thinking appear to remain 
one of the bastions of AI (cg. Wheeler 2005). 
Against this backdrop, Hasse brings diverging 
strands of contemporary thinking that insists on 
the material nature of every aspect of ‘our’ ex-
istence. Based on that, she points out that 
“knowing is not reducible to a mental process; 
knowing is rather a physical practice of engage-
ment” (4). Furthermore, she also emphasizes 
that this physical practice of engagement is a 
collective practice that “entangles humans and 
non-humans” (8). The term posthuman then 
marks the physical embeddedness and the entan-
glement of humans and non-humans – both as 
foundational for re-conceptualizing learning.  
“Experience is thus not just subjective in an in-
dividualist way, but to some extent collectively 
shared through our socio-cultural learning pro-
cesses that merge words, meanings and materi-
als in ways that make social communication 
possible” (6). With this, Hasse proposes an ac-
count of posthuman learning as collective, so-
cio-cultural experience that strongly differs 
from machine learning. She understands the lat-
ter as the context-free practice of, in short, ma-
nipulating numbers.          
4 READING INSIGHTS 
TOGETHER: IMPULSES FOR 
BECOMING RESPONSIBLE FOR 
THE IOT 
In this paper, I situated the IoT by reconstructing 
briefly selected aspects of the historical lineage 
between ubicomp and the IoT. With this, I pro-
pose to make the the IoT graspable and work 
against the tendency that this ubiquitous phe-
nomenon becomes intangible.  
As a result, I argue that the IoT as embedded and 
distributed calm technology cannot be reduced 
to a purely abstract, number crunching means of 
collecting data through connecting things and 
persons. Rather, it can be situated within a cri-
tique on the computational culture from which 
the personal computer emerged. In addition, the 
impact on ‘our’ being-in-the-world are, with 
Hayles, of psychological as well as physiologi-
cal nature. In short, calm technology conditions 
‘human experience’, that is, learning.    
How to grapple with learning at the age of the 
IoT? MachKenzie and Hasse both expand ‘our’ 
analytical framework for engaging with and 
conzeptualizing the transformations of learning.    
With Mackenzie, I furthermore suggest under-
standing the use of calm technology for control-
ing and monitoring every aspect of human exist-
ence as not inherent to the idea and realization 
of distributed, but connected minituarized com-
puters. Rather, the convergence of the IoT and 
(self-)quantification can be considered to be a 
historically specific configuration of human-
machine relations – while reconfigurations are 
possible. With Hasse, I take learning as collec-
tive, sociomateiral, that is, posthuman experi-
ence as the point of departure for such reconfig-
urations. 
Finally, I suggest an account of becoming re-
sponsible for digital connectivity at the age of 
the IoT that assesses at the possibility of, but 
maybe also the need for reconfigurations of the 
relation between human and technology. This 
means to reconsider the relation between ma-
chine and posthuman learning – as interwoven 
forms of human/machine learning – while taking 
into account the power workings as much as the 
potential of data practice for either limiting or 
expanding ‘our’ posthuman capacity to experi-
ence. 
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